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In late 2014, two grand juries returned controversial no bill decisions in
police killings, one in Ferguson, Missouri, and one in New York City. These
outcomes have renewed calls for grand jury reform, and whatever one thinks of
these particular processes and outcomes, such reform is long overdue. One
logical source of reform to better respect privacy in records, which would have
incidental benefits beyond this privacy focus, would be the newly enacted
American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice on Law
Enforcement Access to Third Party Records (LEATPR). But LEATPR exempts
from its requirements access to records via a grand jury subpoena, and,
perhaps more surprisingly, potentially exempts access via a “functionally
equivalent prosecutorial subpoena.” The impetus for this exemption was a
concern that applying LEATPR’s requirements to the grand jury, or even to its
functional equivalent, is unnecessary and might radically undermine
longstanding systems of criminal investigation in perhaps unforeseeable ways.
This Article addresses whether this exception can be justified by reviewing each
of the four main regulatory mechanisms of LEATPR and examining whether
grand jury procedures provide an adequate substitute. In finding that they do
not, this Article indicates how to improve the grand jury process. These
improvements would of course not resolve the very difficult and multifaceted social
ills reflected in the controversy over recent grand jury decisions, but they could
begin to restore the legitimacy of this once-revered but now-maligned institution.
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know my incredible high regard for Andy as a person and for Andy as a scholar. He
was a giant. I am grateful to have known him as a friend, and I am humbled to have
this role in what is likely his final publication. In short, I will be grateful if everything
good in the Article is attributed to Andy, and anything amiss is attributed to me.

TASLITZ.HENDERSON.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

REFORMING THE GRAND JURY

2/3/2015 8:14 PM

197

OVERVIEW
On August 9, 2014, a white police officer in Ferguson, Missouri,
fatally shot a black teenager.1
After an unusually extensive
consideration, a grand jury decided not to indict the officer.2 Less
than a month prior to the Ferguson incident, on July 17, 2014, a
white police officer in New York City used a chokehold in arresting a
black man, likewise killing him.3 A grand jury decided not to indict.4
Both outcomes resulted in anger and protest, unfortunately
including significant violence in Ferguson.5 And together the
outcomes have renewed calls for grand jury reform.6
The grand jury performs both shield and sword roles, the shield
being its ability to refuse indictment as occurred in these cases, and
the sword being its ability to obtain vast information in the
investigation of crime. Many of the perceived problems in the
exercise of its shield role, including prosecutorial dominance and
lack of transparency and accountability, are also evident in its
investigatory function. Thus, improving one will naturally improve
the other. And while it is not implicated in these two recently
prominent grand juries, given the massive and ever-increasing
amounts of private information recorded and stored today,7 grand
jury access to private information is of significant concern.
A logical source of reform to better respect privacy in records
would be the newly enacted ABA Standards for Criminal Justice on
Law Enforcement Access to Third Party Records (LEATPR).8
LEATPR is designed to fill a constitutional hole in federal privacy
1. See What Happened in Ferguson?, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-town-under-siege-after-police-shooting.html (last
visited Dec. 30, 2014).
2. See id.
3. See Andy Newman, The Death of Eric Garner, and the Events That Followed, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/12/04/nyregion/
04garner-timeline.html#/#time356_10536.
4. See id.
5. See Monica Davey & Manny Fernandez, Security in Ferguson Is Tightened After
Night of Unrest, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/26/
us/ferguson-missouri-violence.html.
6. See Patrik Jonsson, In Wake of Eric Garner Case, Should Grand Jury System Be
Reformed?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Dec. 6, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/
Justice/2014/1206/In-wake-of-Eric-Garner-case-should-grand-jury-system-bereformed; Marc Santora, Mayor de Blasio Announces Retraining of New York Police, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/05/nyregion/mayor-billde-blasio-retraining-new-york-police-dept-eric-garner.html.
7. See Stephen E. Henderson, Our Records Panopticon and the American Bar
Association Standards for Criminal Justice, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 699, 700–09 (2014)
[hereinafter Henderson, Our Records Panopticon].
8. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD
PARTY RECORDS 2 (3d ed. 2013) [hereinafter LEATPR STANDARDS].
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protection created by the third party doctrine.9 Though that
doctrine has some exceptions and inconsistencies,10 its core idea is
that what information a person has shared with even one other
person or institution loses privacy protection under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution as to law enforcement
access from that person or institution.11 The doctrine is based on the
idea that privacy equates to secrecy and is an all-or-nothing concept.12
We and others have written about the illogic of this approach.13
Sound philosophical ideas of privacy and social science studies of
expectations lead to a very different idea of privacy as control over
information about the self.14 Privacy is thus not typically present or
absent but most often exists in degrees and varies in quality. People
should and do care about to whom they present information, for
what purposes, and what happens to that shared information. They
justifiably believe that information shared, for example, with a good
friend about a highly personal matter should not result in the world
9. See ANDREW E. TASLITZ, MARGARET L. PARIS & LENESE A. HERBERT,
CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 117 (4th ed. 2010) (offering a basic
explanation of the third party doctrine); Stephen E. Henderson, After United States
v. Jones, After the Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 431
(2013) [hereinafter Henderson, After United States v. Jones] (attacking the third
party doctrine and predicting its gradual demise); Stephen E. Henderson, The Timely
Demise of the Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 39 (2011)
[hereinafter Henderson, The Timely Demise] (similar); Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the
Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561 (2009) (defending the third party
doctrine); Orin S. Kerr, Defending the Third-Party Doctrine: A Response to Epstein and
Murphy, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1229 (2009) (similar).
Not all states follow the third party doctrine as a matter of state constitutional law,
let alone as a matter of statutory law. See generally Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the
(Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest
of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975 (2007); Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All Fifty
States: How to Apply the Fourth Amendment and Its State Analogs to Protect Third Party
Information from Unreasonable Search, 55 CATH. U.L. REV. 373 (2006).
10. See Henderson, After United States v. Jones, supra note 9, at 434–47
(explaining both relevant changes in technology and the Supreme Court’s conflicted
jurisprudence over the last quarter century); Henderson, The Timely Demise, supra
note 9, at 40–45 (similar).
11. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 9, at 117.
12. See id.; LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 8, Standard 25-4.1(a) cmt.
13. LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 8, Standards 25-3.3 cmt., 25-4.1(a) cmt.;
Stephen E. Henderson, Expectations of Privacy in Social Media, 31 MISS. C.L. REV. 227,
232–33 (2012) [hereinafter Henderson, Expectations of Privacy]; Andrew E. Taslitz,
Privacy as Struggle, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 501, 502 (2007); Daniel J. Solove, Data Privacy
and the Vanishing Fourth Amendment, CHAMPION, May 2005, at 20, 20; Andrew E.
Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: Technology, Privacy, and
Human Emotions, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 131, 133–34, 151 (2002)
[hereinafter Taslitz, Human Emotions]; Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment
for the Twenty-First Century, 65 IND. L.J. 549, 564–69 (1990); Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
14. See LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 8, Standard 25-3.3 cmt.; CHRISTOPHER
SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT 108–16, 183–85 (2007); Taslitz, Human Emotions, supra note 13, at 155–58.
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at large being entitled to know that information. Nor does sharing
information with one’s bank mean, without more, that it is thereby
fairly accessible to the police conducting criminal investigations.15
Yet the result of the third party doctrine has been that, absent
occasional and checkered statutory protection, simple law
enforcement requests, or at most easy-to-obtain subpoenas, are all
that law enforcement needs to access information about bank
accounts, shopping preferences, viewing habits, communications,
Internet usage, and a host of other matters.16
LEATPR adopts four methods for protecting against too-ready
government access to information about individuals held in third
party institutional records. First, LEATPR requires some level of
justification for law enforcement access to such records in the
investigatory stage of criminal cases.17 This level of justification is not
uniform. To the contrary, the level varies with the degree of privacy
held in the information contained in the record.18 Records can be
highly private, moderately private, minimally private, or not private.19
Highly private information requires a warrant based on probable
cause, moderately private information a court order based on
reasonable suspicion (or relevance), minimally private information a
prosecutor determination of relevance, and not-private information
merely a legitimate law enforcement purpose.20 Legislatures are free
to consider more demanding restraints for highly private
information, such as additional administrative approval or greater

15. Contra United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443–45 (1976) (holding that
bank customers have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their own bank
accounts under the Fourth Amendment).
16. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 14, at 179–80.
17. LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 8, Standard 25-5.3.
18. Id. Standard 25-5.3(a).
19. Id. Standard 25-4.1. Factors determining the degree of privacy protection
include the extent to which:
(a) the initial transfer of such information to an institutional third party
is reasonably necessary to participate meaningfully in society or in
commerce, or is socially beneficial, including to freedom of speech and
association;
(b) such information is personal, including the extent to which it is
intimate and likely to cause embarrassment or stigma if disclosed, and
whether outside of the initial transfer to an institutional third party it is
typically disclosed only within one’s close social network, if at all;
(c) such information is accessible to and accessed by non-government
persons outside the institutional third party; and
(d) existing law, including the law of privilege, restricts or allows access
to and dissemination of such information or of comparable information.
Id. Standard 25-4.1.
20. Id. Standards 25-5.2, 25-5.3.
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investigative need.21 And legislatures may consider lowering a
category’s required justification if applying full protection would
significantly interfere with solving and punishing a category of
crime.22 For example, a record otherwise entitled to probable cause
protection might require only proof of reasonable suspicion. The
justification-level protection is thus varied, is flexible, and accounts
for the degree of privacy protection and the needs of law
enforcement. Nevertheless, some level of justification is required,
unlike the general situation under current law,23 and for highly or
moderately protected information LEATPR requires supervision by
an independent magistrate.24
Second, for moderately and highly protected information,
LEATPR requires providing notice—or, in some cases, delayed
notice—to the focus of the record, meaning to the person whom the
information concerns.25 That notice recalibrates the perspective of
the focus, provides some accountability, and enables the focus to
raise whatever legal challenges might be available to limit or control
the spread, use, and retention of the information.
Third, all records obtained must be protected against
unauthorized access and distribution.26 Such distribution is typically
limited to those involved in the investigation for which the records
were obtained and only to the extent necessary to further the
investigation.27 Moderately and highly protected records require
audit logs noting access and must be destroyed according to an
established schedule.28 These requirements limit the dissemination
of information to those with a need to know and create temporal
limits on who may use the information and for what purposes.
Disclosure is permitted (1) where required by discovery rules29 or (2)
where needed in another government investigation provided that, if
the information is being transferred to a different government
agency, that agency provides an official certification of relevance.30

21. Id. Standard 25-5.3(b).
22. Id. Standard 25-4.2(b).
23. See 1 PETER J. HENNING ET AL., MASTERING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE
INVESTIGATORY STAGE 33–34 (2010) [hereinafter HENNING ET AL., THE
INVESTIGATORY STAGE].
24. See LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 8, Standards 25-5.2(a) cmt., 25-5.3(a) cmt.
25. Id. Standards 25-1.1(c), 25-5.7(b)–(d).
26. Id. Standard 25-6.1(a).
27. Id. Standards 25-6.1(a)(ii), 25-6.2.
28. Id. Standard 25-6.1(b).
29. Id. Standard 25-6.2(a).
30. Id. Standard 25-6.2(b). Provision is also made for inter-agency disclosure in
exigent circumstances upon law enforcement officer or prosecutor request. Id.
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Fourth, the legislature must create accountability mechanisms.31
Although LEATPR merely provides a laundry list of such mechanisms
rather than recounting details, these mechanisms include, as most
relevant here, “appropriate periodic review and public reporting.”32
Rephrased, LEATPR requires some level of transparency and critical
accountability reporting in order for the system of access to protected
information to continue.33
LEATPR provides exceptions to many or all of its requirements.
Among those exceptions is “access to records via a grand jury
subpoena, or in jurisdictions where grand juries are typically not
used, a functionally equivalent prosecutorial subpoena.”34 During
drafting, one primary justification for this exception was that the
grand jury historically played a unique role in our criminal justice
system.35 Although its shield (indictment) and sword (subpoena)
roles might often be conflated in that history and in public
consciousness, the latter role allegedly requires that a grand jury have
few limits imposed on its investigatory authority.36 To limit that role,
31. Id. Standard 25-7.1.
32. Id.
33. See Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1154–65 (2000)
(summarizing the virtues of transparency for improving governmental performance
and democratic accountability).
34. LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 8, Standard 25-2.1(c).
35. See id. Standard 25-2.1(c) cmt. See generally GEORGE J. EDWARDS, JR., THE
GRAND JURY: CONSIDERED FROM AN HISTORICAL, POLITICAL AND LEGAL STANDPOINT, AND
THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING THERETO 31–44 (1906) (offering a concise
traditional history of the grand jury). But critics bemoan the long lost nature of this
unique role. In the words of leading grand jury scholar Roger Fairfax:
Many believe the grand jury—one of the oldest protections known to the
American constitutional order—has strayed from its moorings and has
eroded beyond recognition. A common criticism is that the grand jury’s
central purpose has morphed from the protection of individual rights to the
facilitation of governmental investigative power. Others echo Jeremy
Bentham’s 19th century critique that the grand jury is unnecessary and
redundant in a modernized criminal justice system. Although commentators
differ as to the degree of the grand jury’s atrophy, most scholars, lawyers,
and judges paint a fairly bleak portrait of the grand jury’s present utility as
the bulwark of liberty it was designed to be.
Roger Anthony Fairfax, Jr., Introduction, in GRAND JURY 2.0: MODERN PERSPECTIVES ON
THE GRAND JURY xv, xv (Roger Anthony Fairfax, Jr. ed., 2011) [hereinafter GRAND JURY
2.0]. Joshua Dressler and George Thomas similarly note that “the modern grand
jury rarely serves as the shield that the Framers intended,” and that “[n]o other
country in the world uses grand juries.” JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PROSECUTING CRIME 848 (5th ed. 2013). Sometimes standing
alone is admirable, but it should cause one to pause and consider.
36. In the words of the Supreme Court,
[t]he grand jury occupies a unique role in our criminal justice system. It is
an investigatory body charged with the responsibility of determining whether
or not a crime has been committed. . . . [T]he grand jury can investigate
merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just because it
wants assurance that it is not. The function of the grand jury is to inquire
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it was feared, might radically undermine longstanding systems of
criminal investigation in perhaps unforeseeable ways.37 Moreover,
grand jury secrecy provisions and judicial supervision already provide
some privacy protection.38 Yet the exception is not limited to grand
jury subpoenas but extends to “functionally equivalent prosecutorial
subpoena[s]” in jurisdictions where grand juries are not used.39
LEATPR makes little effort in its text or commentary to define what
“functionally equivalent” means,40 and prosecutorial subpoenas look
very little like the traditional grand jury, obviously lacking—at the
very least—lay participation and direction.41 The exception therefore
has the potential to dramatically limit LEATPR’s scope, undermining
many of the Standards’ purposes.42
By reviewing each of LEATPR’s four main regulatory mechanisms
and examining whether grand jury procedures provide an adequate
into all information that might possibly bear on its investigation until it has
identified an offense or has satisfied itself that none has occurred. As a
necessary consequence of its investigatory function, the grand jury paints
with a broad brush. A grand jury investigation is not fully carried out until
every available clue has been run down and all witnesses examined in every
proper way to find if a crime has been committed.
United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). And again,
[i]t is a grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and inquisition,
the scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited narrowly by questions of
propriety or forecasts of the probable result of the investigation, or by doubts
whether any particular individual will be found properly subject to an
accusation of crime.
Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919). In some jurisdictions, only this
“sword” investigatory function remains. See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 8.1(a) (3d ed. 2007).
37. Cf. SLOBOGIN, supra note 14, at 146 (“Without the ability readily to obtain the
records of corporations, partnerships, and other entities, government agencies would
be frustrated in their efforts to ensure that corporate tax laws, bank laws, securities
laws, and a host of other regulatory statues were enforced.”). Professor Taslitz was a
member of the task force that began drafting LEATPR and of the ABA Criminal
Justice Council that approved the near-final version of LEATPR. Professor
Henderson was the Reporter. These arguments were made, most often by some
prosecutors, as part of those debates.
38. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972); CHARLES DOYLE, THE
FEDERAL GRAND JURY 12–18 (2008).
39. LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 8, Standard 25-2.1(c).
40. For an explanation of this omission (unsatisfying though it may be), see
Henderson, Our Records Panopticon, supra note 7, at 716–18. The Commentary
provides this limited guidance: “Legislatures, courts, and administrative agencies
should be careful, however, to strictly cabin this exception to means for which (1)
there is historical practice that has not been discredited and that remains relevantly
applicable, and (2) that historical practice includes privacy safeguards equivalent to
those of the federal grand jury.” LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 8, Standard 252.1(c) cmt.
41. See LAFAVE, supra note 36, § 8.1(c) (comparing and contrasting prosecutorial
subpoenas with grand jury investigations).
42. For an argument hoping this will not happen, see Henderson, Our Records
Panopticon, supra note 7, at 716–18.
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substitute, this Article addresses whether LEATPR’s grand jury
exception can be justified. Part I addresses levels of justification, Part
II notice provisions, Part III access limitations, and Part IV
accountability mechanisms. In determining that the exception is not
justified, the Article suggests some important improvements to the
modern grand jury. Perhaps, given contemporary events, it will
finally be possible to restore some luster to this once-revered but now
maligned institution.
I.

LEVELS OF JUSTIFICATION

Probable cause and reasonable suspicion, the traditional standards
of justification used as prerequisites to police searches and seizures,
serve several important purposes.43 Notably, they require proof of
individualized suspicion. Such proof prevents police from invading
privacy on fishing expeditions that are based upon unsupported
hunches, stereotypes, or simple biases.44 Instead, police must have
evidence that this individual engaged in criminal activity. This
requirement is part and parcel of respect for persons.45 Persons are
judged based upon their individual behavior, not on their
membership in a group, not on residence in a particular neighborhood,
and not for generally being disliked by members of law
enforcement.46 Moreover, the proof may not be speculative but must,
in the case of probable cause, hover around a preponderance of the
evidence, thus setting a relatively familiar standard to guide police.47
Furthermore, the police do not themselves determine levels of
justification, at least ultimately. Rather, an independent magistrate
must make these determinations.48 That separation reduces the
43. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (formulating the modern standard of
probable cause); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (formulating the standard of
reasonable suspicion).
44. See generally Andrew E. Taslitz, Cybersurveillance Without Restraint? The Meaning
and Social Value of the Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion Standards in Governmental
Access to Third-Party Electronic Records, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 839 (2013)
[hereinafter Taslitz, Cybersurveillance]; Andrew E. Taslitz, What Is Probable Cause, and
Why Should We Care?: The Costs, Benefits, and Meaning of Individualized Suspicion, 73
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 145 (2010) [hereinafter Taslitz, Individualized Suspicion].
45. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 15, 47–51 (2003).
46. See Taslitz, Individualized Suspicion, supra note 44, at 146.
47. See Taslitz, Cybersurveillance, supra note 44, at 883–89, 895–97. Professor
Henderson would, at least as a descriptive matter and probably as a normative one,
place probable cause at a slightly lower threshold. See Stephen E. Henderson, RealTime and Historic Location Surveillance After United States v. Jones: An Administrable,
Mildly Mosaic Approach, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 803, 822 n.104 (2013).
Regardless of that precise quantification, the described benefit remains.
48. Even if it is one of the many police decisions that today does not require
judicial preclearance, a magistrate will review the police determination if there is a
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inevitable bias in favor of one’s self-perceived wisdom. Moreover,
because police must articulate specific reasons to justify their beliefs
to an acceptable level of proof, police must account for their
actions—that is, literally be answerable for them.49 Social science
research demonstrates that an awareness that one will need to justify
her actions to a third party reduces the chance of error.50 LEATPR’s
“relevance” standard for minimally protected information makes this
justification easy to satisfy for that category, but some accountability
is nevertheless required.51
And LEATPR proceeds from the
assumption that where less is at stake—that is, where privacy
interests are less—a lower level of justification is acceptable to give
law enforcement more leeway.52
Yet courts have rarely imposed any justification requirement upon
grand jury records subpoenas, or at least not any meaningful one.
Grandly proclaiming that “the public . . . has a right to every man’s
evidence,”53 but never explaining how that alleged right comports
with the Fourth Amendment’s limited-government norm, the
modern Supreme Court has failed to meaningfully regulate grand
jury subpoenas.54
Although that upshot is clear, the Court’s
jurisprudence in this area is frustratingly opaque.
As explained in LaFave’s treatise,55 in 1886, the Court took the very
strong position in Boyd v. United States56 that compelling the
motion to suppress and will also decide whether there is probable cause warranting
any sustained jailing and ultimate prosecution. This is not to say, of course, that an
after-the-fact decision is necessarily equivalent to one ex ante. See HENNING ET AL., THE
INVESTIGATORY STAGE, supra note 23, at 62 (discussing hindsight bias).
49. See Taslitz, Individualized Suspicion, supra note 44, at 189.
50. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Police Are People Too: Cognitive Obstacles to, and
Opportunities for, Police Getting the Individualized Suspicion Judgment Right, 8 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 7, 31–32, 64–66 (2010) [hereinafter Taslitz, Police Are People Too].
51. See LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 8, Standard 25-5.3(a)(iii). The Federal
Rules of Evidence define relevant evidence as evidence likely to change the probability
of an element of a crime, claim, or defense’s existence by any nonzero amount. FED. R.
EVID. 401; STEVEN I. FRIEDLAND, PAUL BERGMAN & ANDREW E. TASLITZ, EVIDENCE LAW
AND PRACTICE 46–50 (5th ed. 2012) (explaining this definition’s meaning).
52. See supra text accompanying notes 17–24 (explaining the sliding scale of
privacy protections under LEATPR).
53. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972) (quoting United States v.
Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)).
54. See id. at 701 (noting that the grand jury’s inquiries “may be triggered by tips,
rumors, evidence proffered by the prosecutor, or the personal knowledge of the
grand jurors”); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642–43 (1950)
(noting that a grand jury may “investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being
violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not”); DOYLE, supra note 38,
at 2 (“The grand jury may begin its examination even in the absence of probable
cause or any other level of suspicion that a crime has been committed within its
reach.”); SLOBOGIN, supra note 14, at 140–41 (describing the general lack of regulation).
55. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 36, § 8.7(a).
56. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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production of one’s private papers was per se unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment.57 Twenty years later, in Hale v. Henkel,58 the
Court did away with that absolute rule, but in an opinion that
required continued Fourth Amendment scrutiny59—indeed a
context-specific scrutiny that fits nicely within the modern
jurisprudence of Fourth Amendment reasonableness. But forty years
after Hale, in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling,60 the Court
stated that subpoenas “present no question of actual search and
seizure.”61 Yet the Oklahoma Press Court nonetheless evaluated the
subpoenas for overbreadth,62 and on several occasions since the
Court has recognized this protection against overbreadth as a
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.63
So, perhaps ordinary subpoenas do not require Fourth
Amendment justification.64 Under this view, only overly broad or
unduly burdensome subpoenas are Fourth Amendment searches,
and given modern data duplication technology, those are extremely
rare.65 Or, perhaps the Fourth Amendment reasonableness criterion
does regulate all subpoenas, especially because the Court’s
developmental cases all addressed subpoenas of business records as
opposed to more private personal records.66 Under this view, courts
could impose a meaningful justification requirement when
subpoenas seek private records. But to date they have only done so
for subpoenas seeking a physical intrusion into the body.67 Thus,
57. Id. at 630; see also SLOBOGIN, supra note 14, at 145–48 (discussing Boyd and the
jurisprudence that followed thereafter).
58. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
59. Id. at 73, 76–77.
60. 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
61. Id. at 195.
62. Id. at 213.
63. See Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408, 414–15 (1984); United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 11 (1973); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 (1967).
64. TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 9, at 146 (“A subpoena . . . is generally
considered neither a search nor a seizure.”).
65. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 36, § 8.7(a)–(c).
66. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 14, at 148; cf. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 486 F.2d
85, 93 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding as a matter of supervisory power that grand jury
subpoenas may only be enforced after “the Government . . . make[s] some
preliminary showing by affidavit that each item is at least [i] relevant to an
investigation being conducted by the grand jury and [ii] properly within its
jurisdiction, and is [iii] not sought primarily for another purpose”).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 736 F.3d 54, 61 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding,
without citation support, that because “there was no determination by a grand jury or
a judge of whether any particular level of Fourth Amendment justification had been
met to justify the grand jury subpoena for the DNA sample . . . [defendant’s] Fourth
Amendment rights were then violated”); In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving
Vickers, 38 F. Supp. 2d 159, 165–68 (D.N.H. 1998) (regulating but permitting grand
jury subpoena for saliva); Floralynn Einesman, Vampires Among Us—Does a Grand Jury
Subpoena for Blood Violate the Fourth Amendment?, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 327, 363–71 (1995)
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even courts requiring some Fourth Amendment justification for all
records subpoenas might hold that reasonableness in this context has
no more teeth than the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
reasonableness requirement of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
17(c), which renders a subpoena unacceptable only when “there is
no reasonable possibility that the category of materials the
Government seeks will produce information relevant to the general
subject of the grand jury’s investigation.”68
A prosecutor using a grand jury subpoena can therefore currently
be confident that she will prevail even if someone raises an objection;
at worst she will narrow the request and thereby avoid meaningful
review. Moreover, the institutional third party, for example Verizon,
receives the subpoena. The account holder will likely never learn of
its issuance.69 Verizon may have little incentive on its own to combat,
potentially at significant expense, a subpoena that leads to
information incriminating an individual subscriber.
The Fifth Amendment’s privilege against compelled selfincrimination similarly has little to no impact in the context of
subpoenas for third party records. First, there is no privilege based
upon privacy but rather only upon incrimination.70 Nor is there Fifth
Amendment protection for pre-existing records—those for which the
government did not compel creation.71 There can, of course, be Fifth
Amendment protection for the act of producing pre-existing
records.72 When an individual responds to a subpoena by turning
over requested records, he is admitting that the records exist, that
they are in his possession, and that they are authentic—they are what
they purport to be, namely, accurate originals or copies of the items
(collecting and describing cases). There is no principled reason to restrict grand
jury subpoenas for minimal physical intrusions (e.g., a DNA cheek swap or
fingerprint) but not for major privacy intrusions (e.g., a diary, email records, or
invasive questioning). Thus, while these cases relating to physical intrusion do not
directly inform this Article’s concern with access to third party records, they could
provide a springboard for similarly restricting invasive records subpoenas.
68. United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1991) (emphasis added).
69. There can, of course, be applicable statutory restrictions. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703 (2012) (regulating government access to stored electronic communications).
70. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401 (1976) (“[T]he Fifth
Amendment protects against compelled self-incrimination, not [the disclosure of]
private information.” (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
71. See id. at 409–10; see also 2 PETER J. HENNING ET AL., MASTERING CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: THE ADJUDICATORY STAGE 34 (2012); LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 36,
§ 8.12(f). Most records, including most business records, were not compelled in
their creation. See TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 9, at 816–18; see also United
States v. Doe (Doe I), 465 U.S. 605, 610 (1984) (“[w]here the preparation of business
records is voluntary, no compulsion is present” and the Fifth Amendment privilege
does not apply).
72. Doe I, 465 U.S. at 612; Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410.
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the government requested.73 Yet this limited protection is not
available when these facts can be independently proven; when, in
short, they are a “foregone conclusion.”74 Although it is not
sufficient that a type of record is commonly kept,75 the mere
existence, location, and authenticity of records are often readily
provable by other means.76 Most important, the Fifth Amendment
only applies when the person who is compelled (subpoenaed) is the
person who will be incriminated.77 With third party records,
however, the institutional third party receives the subpoena but the
subscriber or customer is typically incriminated, leaving no Fifth
Amendment protection.
In theory, the grand jurors would themselves act as a screening
device, refusing to issue subpoenas that unnecessarily infringe upon
privacy rights.78 In practice, however, grand juror power is limited.
Grand jurors assemble at the direction of the prosecutor79 and, once
gathered, are told by the prosecutor whom to subpoena, or merely
receive the results of the prosecutor-issued subpoena.80
The

73. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410, 412.
74. See id. at 411 (explaining that compelling a taxpayer to produce tax
documents is not incriminating because the documents’ existence and the taxpayer’s
control of them is a “foregone conclusion”); see also Robert P. Mosteller, Cowboy
Prosecutors and Subpoenas for Incriminating Evidence: The Consequences and Correction of
Excess, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 487, 508–10 (2001) (elaborating on the meaning of
“foregone conclusion”).
75. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 44–45 (2000) (rejecting “the
overbroad argument that a businessman . . . will always possess general business
and tax records”).
76. But see Mosteller, supra note 74, at 518–19, 523–30 (arguing that it is
becoming harder for prosecutors to prove that finding subpoenaed evidence is,
independent from the subpoena, a foregone conclusion). Where the act-ofproduction facts are not a foregone conclusion, the government can compel
production by granting act-of-production immunity that will not itself directly
immunize the content of the records. Doe I, 465 U.S. at 617 n.17. But the grant
might nonetheless have that practical effect. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 36, § 8.13(c).
77. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 398–99.
78. See DOYLE, supra note 38, at 1 (“But the exclusive power to accuse is also the
power not to accuse and early on the grand jury became both the ‘sword and the
shield of justice.’” (quoting United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 186 n.1 (5th Cir.
1965) (Wisdom, J., concurring))).
79. See Susan W. Brenner, The Voice of the Community: A Case for Grand Jury
Independence, 3 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 67, 81–82 (1995) [hereinafter Brenner, Voice
of the Community].
80. See DOYLE, supra note 38, at 5 (noting that prosecutors generally decide whom
to subpoena, the order in which to call witnesses, the questions to ask them, the law
given to the grand jurors, and the language of the indictment); LAFAVE ET AL., supra
note 36, § 8.2(c) (additionally noting that the prosecutor advises regarding any
objections raised by witnesses, decides whether to prosecute for contempt, and
decides whether to seek immunity). In a few states, grand jurors apparently have
genuine input and perhaps even control. See 1 SARA SUN BEALE ET AL., GRAND JURY
LAW AND PRACTICE § 6:2 (2d ed. 2013). On the other hand, some federal prosecutors
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prosecutor tells the grand jurors the law and, given heavy case loads,
presses the grand jurors to work quickly,81 a pressure that makes
deliberation over subpoenas difficult and unlikely. Nobody informs
grand jurors of their full powers or independence.82 Indeed, grand
jurors who have spoken about their experience have expressed
confusion regarding their role and frustration with their passivity in
the face of enormous prosecutor power.83 Grand jurors complained
about prosecutor control over witness questioning, inability to hear
exculpatory evidence, inability to independently interpret the law,
lack of clarity as to the role of hearsay, sense of an inability to nullify
prosecutor overreaching, and overwork that gave them little time to
exercise prosecutorial oversight.84
The widespread use of hearsay certainly limits grand jury
independence. Often, there is only a single grand jury witness: a
detective.85 The detective summarizes selected witness statements
and police investigations.86 Even if there were cross-examination—
which there is not—it would be difficult to cross-examine a single
witness merely reading from a report about the reliability or
truthfulness of some other witness’ statements.87
As one
commentator put it,
using hearsay results in a dramatic decrease in the length, detail,
and persuasive value of the presentation made by the prosecutor.
When grand jurors are repeatedly subjected to such performances,
they grow less likely to exercise their independent judgment in the

pre-screen witnesses to determine whether they will even appear before the grand
jury, all under the auspices of the grand jury subpoena authority. Id.
81. See Susan W. Brenner, Grand Jurors Speak, in GRAND JURY 2.0, supra note 35,
at 25, 39–40 [hereinafter Brenner, Grand Jurors Speak] (sharing emails from a
grand juror expressing frustration with the number of complex investigations
occurring at once).
82. See Brenner, Voice of the Community, supra note 79, at 74–76; Michael Daly
Hawkins, Honoring the Voice of the Citizen: Breathing Life into the Grand Jury Requirement,
in GRAND JURY 2.0, supra note 35, at 115, 117–18. For a rather remarkable story of
fighting for grand jury independence in Ohio as a foreperson, see Phyllis L. Crocker,
Commentary, Appointed but (Nearly) Prevented From Serving: My Experiences as a Grand
Jury Foreperson, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 289 (2004).
83. See Brenner, Grand Jurors Speak, supra note 81, at 27–40.
84. Id.
85. Ric Simmons, The True Goals of the Modern Grand Jury—and How to Achieve
Them, in GRAND JURY 2.0, supra note 35, at 223, 225–26. A small minority of states are
more restrictive in their approach to hearsay before the grand jury. See 4 WAYNE R.
LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 15.2(d) (3d ed. 2007). For an argument that
the lack of evidentiary restrictions is ahistoric, see Niki Kuckes, Retelling Grand Jury
History, in GRAND JURY 2.0, supra note 35, at 125, 136–39.
86. See Simmons, supra note 85, at 225–26.
87. See id.
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cases brought before them, and more likely summarily to accept
what they are given.88

There is, theoretically, judicial supervision of the grand jury. But
once the grand jury is charged it will operate without a judge
present,89 and that—combined with the limited grounds for
challenging subpoenas in the first place—makes judicial supervision
of grand jury hearings generally, and of subpoenas specifically,
minimal.90 Only very few jurisdictions provide for judicial review of a
grand jury transcript to ensure the correctness of a grand jury
decision to indict.91
The lack of judicial review leads to the perception that grand jury
proceedings are lesser lights of the justice system, entitled to less
vigorous due process protections because judicial involvement at any
subsequent trial will cure any grand jury hearing defects.92 Yet only a
tiny fraction of prosecutions ever reach trial, well over ninety percent
resulting in guilty pleas.93 For those prosecutions that do make it to
trial, the grand jury decision to indict causes a frightening and
uncertain experience that is enormously burdensome even for those
ultimately acquitted, and to a prosecution that a vigilant
representative of the people might have blocked on policy and
88. Id. at 226. Explained Judge Weinstein:
[G]rand jurors [on the federal level] do not hear cases with the rough edges
that result from the often halting, inconsistent, and incomplete testimony of
honest observers of events. Thus, they are unable to distinguish between
prosecutions which are strong and those which are relatively weak. All cases
are presented in an equally homogenized form. A grand jury so conditioned
is unable to adequately serve its function as a screening agency.
United States v. Arcuri, 282 F. Supp. 347, 349 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
89. DOYLE, supra note 38, at 5.
90. Cf. Sara Sun Beale & James E. Felman, Enlisting and Deploying Federal Grand
Juries in the War on Terrorism, in GRAND JURY 2.0, supra note 35, at 3, 15
(recommending “return of the traditional role of the judiciary in supervising the
disclosure of grand jury materials that relate to terrorism . . . and threats of attack”).
The Supreme Court has generally restricted the federal courts’ supervisory authority
over grand juries. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 45–47, 55 (1992)
(holding that federal courts lack the authority to regulate prosecutorial conduct
before the grand jury independent of statute or rule of criminal procedure).
91. Simmons, supra note 85, at 227. For a review of the history regarding judicial
review of grand jury evidence, see Kuckes, supra note 85, at 139–42.
92. See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363–64 (1956) (rejecting any
evidentiary sufficiency challenge to an indictment because a trial will follow);
Simmons, supra note 85, at 227 (concluding that courts place higher significance on
the procedural safeguards associated with all other pre-trial proceedings).
93. See Matthew R. Durose & Patrick A. Langan, Felony Sentences in State Courts,
2004, BUREAU JUST. STAT. BULL., July 2007, at 1, available at http://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/fssc04.pdf (stating that “94% of felony convictions occurred in
state courts,” and of those, 95% were guilty pleas); Mark Motivans, Federal Justice
Statistics, 2010, BUREAU JUST. STAT. BULL., Dec. 2013, at 1, available at http://www.bjs.
gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs10.pdf (stating that 91% of federal felony convictions
were guilty pleas).
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fairness grounds.94 Because no-bill decisions, rare as they are, permit
a prosecutor to try again before another grand jury, the prosecutor
does not worry about her ability to eventually indict.95 This too
contributes to the prosecutor viewing the grand jury as a mere
procedural hurdle at best, or at worst a tool for obtaining
information, rather than a restraint on her office.96
Witnesses are fairly powerless before the grand jury. Although a
number of states have recently changed course, witnesses are
traditionally not allowed to have attorneys with them in the grand
jury room.97 And while witnesses may leave to consult with counsel,98
a prosecutor may, intentionally or not, intimidate a witness from
frequently exercising that right.99 Thus, witnesses provide little
restraint to prosecutorial power.100
LEATPR’s requirement that the prosecutor provide some evidence
that an institutional third party has material in its possession
implicating a particular individual in a crime offers at least a mild
obstacle to willy-nilly invasions of privacy.101
The justification
94. See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Does Grand Jury Discretion Have a Legitimate (and
Useful) Role to Play in Criminal Justice?, in GRAND JURY 2.0, supra note 35, at 57, 57–84
[hereinafter Fairfax, Grand Jury Discretion] (defending the grand jury’s right to nullify
even prosecutions supported by probable cause on numerous grounds, including
sound public policy and democratic representation).
95. See Adriaan Lanni, Implementing the Neighborhood Grand Jury, in GRAND JURY 2.0,
supra note 35, at 171, 180 (explaining the “no-bill” procedure); DOYLE, supra note 38,
at 21 (discussing the prosecutor’s power to resubmit for indictment to the same or a
different grand jury).
96. Peter H. White, Let’s Make a Deal: Negotiating and Defending Immunity for
“Targets and Subjects,” LITIGATION, Fall 2002, at 44, 45 (2002) (“Notwithstanding the
protective role the grand jury was initially intended to serve in our system, it has
evolved into an investigative tool for the prosecution, a virtual extension of the U.S.
Attorney’s office.”).
97. See DOYLE, supra note 38, at 5 (“The grand jury meets behind closed doors
with only the jurors, attorney for the government, witnesses, someone to record
testimony, and possibly an interpreter present.”); BEALE ET AL., supra note 80, § 6:28;
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 36, §§ 8.3(d), 8.14(b).
98. BEALE ET AL., supra note 80, § 6:28.
99. But see Bennett L. Gershman, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 2:10 (2d ed.
2014) (recognizing that berating a witness for exercising the right to counsel
constitutes prosecutorial misconduct).
100. Grand jurors are often ignorant of their right to call witnesses independently
from those selected by the prosecutor, thus further limiting grand jury and witness
power. See ANGELA DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR 26 (2009). Moreover, while that grand juror right seemingly
continues in the federal system despite abolishment of the presentment, see Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 60 (1906), it no longer exists in some states, see LAFAVE ET AL.,
supra note 36, § 8.4(b).
101. This “obstacle” is in sharp contrast to current law. As one expert put it,
[r]esistance is ordinarily futile. Absent self-incrimination or some other
privilege, the law expects citizens to cooperate with efforts to investigate
crime. In the name of this expectation a witness may be arrested, held for
bail, and under some circumstances incarcerated. Even when armed with an
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requirement avoids fishing expeditions,102 requires the state to justify
its invasions of privacy,103 and compels at least some deliberation
about the factual and policy wisdom of seeking to obtain certain
information.104 Extending this requirement to grand juries would be
a minimal hoop for law enforcement to jump through. Yet, like with
a burning hoop in a circus, the hoop’s mere existence would compel
prosecutors to greater care and humility, better protecting privacy
while still enabling the critical law enforcement investigative function.
This is not to say that the justification standard for a grand jury
subpoena necessarily should match that for other methods of
process, nor be consistent across all types of investigations. If, for
example, law enforcement could present a compelling case that
certain corporate or financial investigations absolutely require
greater leeway—perhaps insider trading investigations that otherwise
cannot get off the ground—it would be reasonable for a court or
legislature to accommodate that, especially given that third party
record subpoenas do not threaten physical confrontation and other
harms present in other searches. Our argument is merely that there
is no cause for entirely exempting the grand jury from LEATPR’s
justification requirements.
II. NOTICE
Notice is a fundamental requirement of due process105 that serves
several purposes. One is that notice reduces the impact of a
frightening surprise. In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,106 police executed a
applicable privilege a witness’ compliance with a grand jury subpoena is only
likely to be excused with respect to matters protected by the privilege. A
witness subpoenaed to testify rather than merely produce documents may be
compelled to appear before the grand jury and claim the privilege with
respect to any questions to which it applies. . . . [A]s a general rule, the
grand jury is entitled to every individual’s evidence even though testimony
may prove burdensome, embarrassing, or socially or economically injurious
for the witness.
DOYLE, supra note 38, at 6 (footnotes omitted).
102. Under LEATPR, law enforcement cannot “fish” without a license—that is,
without a warrant, court reasonable suspicion order, or finding of relevance by a
designated authority, depending on the level of privacy protection in the particular
document. See LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 8, Standard 25-5.3(a).
103. Justification and accountability are inherent in the concepts of probable
cause and reasonable suspicion. See supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text.
104. Indeed, some commentators have argued that there is an “executive
exclusionary rule”: preemptive exclusion of evidence by prosecutors who, after
internal deliberation, conclude that the evidence was unconstitutionally obtained
and should not therefore even be offered. Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The
Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 138 (2008).
105. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985).
106. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
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search warrant at the offices of a student newspaper, seeking
photographs of demonstrators who had allegedly assaulted police.107
The newspaper challenged the search on the grounds that the police
should have used a subpoena, given the newspaper’s non-suspect
status and given the First Amendment concerns inherent in the
search of a newspaper office.108 Implicit in that first argument were
the dangers inherent in surprise.109
Surprise is emotionally
unsettling110 and does not permit time to adjust to the State’s
invasion. While in Zurcher the alternative was a subpoena, the notice
benefit does not necessarily require that process. In the context of
modern electronic records, even when responding to a warrant, the
non-suspect record holder will typically itself identify potentially
responsive records.111
Notice also gives the searchee an opportunity to challenge the legal
grounds of the search before it occurs. In Zurcher, a subpoena would
have provided the newspaper time to challenge the search on First
Amendment grounds.112 Use of a warrant, however, meant that the
search occurred and items were seized immediately, leaving only
after-the-fact solutions.113 The Court ultimately upheld the search in
Zurcher,114 but Congress was not pleased. It quickly passed a statute
protecting the media from law enforcement use of search warrants in
a wide array of circumstances, permitting only the use of subpoenas.115
107. Id. at 551–52.
108. See id. at 553 (non-suspect status); id. at 563 (First Amendment).
109. See Brief for Respondents at 8–9, Zurcher, 436 U.S. 547 (Nos. 76-1484, 761600), 1977 WL 189744 (discussing lack of notice and implications thereof); id. at
18–19 (discussing interference and disruption); id. at 28–29 (noting only mode of
resistance to search warrant is violence); id. at 46–47 (emphasizing value of challenge
prior to execution).
110. See generally MATTHIAS GROSS, IGNORANCE AND SURPRISE: SCIENCE, SOCIETY, AND
ECOLOGICAL DESIGN (2010) (surprise confronts us with our own ignorance);
JONATHAN A. MORELL, EVALUATION IN THE FACE OF UNCERTAINTY: ANTICIPATING
SURPRISE AND RESPONDING TO THE INEVITABLE (2010) (surprise sends evaluators into
crisis mode).
111. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(g) (2012) (permitting execution of search warrant
without officer presence); Vindu Goel & James C. McKinley, Jr., Facebook Bid to Shield
Data From the Law Fails, So Far, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2014, at B1 (describing
Facebook’s attempt to derail mass 381-warrant search); Google, Way of a Warrant,
YOUTUBE (Mar. 27, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MeKKHxcJfh0
(explaining how Google responds to search warrants requesting customer data).
112. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 109, at 25–31.
113. Even if technically possible, traditionally warrants do not allow pre-seizure
challenge. See In re Search Warrants Directed to Facebook, Inc. and Dated July 23,
2013 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 17, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2014/06/26/technology/facebook-search-warrants-case-documents.html (rejecting
Facebook’s motion to quash a warrant for electronic communications). This
traditional rule could of course be changed, including by statute.
114. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 567–68.
115. Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (2006).
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When, upon notice, an individual challenges a state action, such
challenge prompts initiation of adversary system procedures.116
Those procedures, involving briefs, hearings, oral argument, and
testimony, slow down the entire process to permit deliberation about
its wisdom.117 Deliberation, if it takes into account many points of
view, often leads to better decisions.118 Party input in deliberations
also increases the perception that fair procedures are being followed,
thus improving the legitimacy of the system.119 Indeed, in some
instances time and publicity alone are sufficient to demonstrate
error, as when the mayor of Houston recently retracted broad
subpoenas issued to area clergy.120 Were search warrants used, the
harm would already be complete.
Notice also demonstrates respect for the potential searchee as an
individual. Unlike in Kafka’s famous novel The Trial,121 in which a
man is arrested and convicted but never told the charges or evidence
against him—thus dehumanizing him—notice treats the individual
involved as someone who deserves an explanation. The State is
answerable to him as a human being, even if he has done wrong.122
Sometimes the law “delays notice,” eliminating some of notice’s
virtues.123 Taking an action and only later telling its subject that it has
occurred does not permit pre-action challenge or as effectively
reduce surprise. Delayed notice should be permitted only in
exceptional circumstances, such as when notice might lead to
violence against witnesses or destruction of evidence.124 Nevertheless,
delayed notice still makes the State answerable to the individual, still
116. For an understanding of the nature of those procedures, see, for example,
STEPHEN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE (1984), and
The Adversary System: Who Wins? Who Loses?, in WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN
LAW 136 (Jeffrey Lehman & Shirelle Phelps eds., 2d ed. 2005).
117. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Temporal Adversarialism, Criminal Justice, and the
Rehnquist Court: The Sluggish Life of Political Factfinding, 94 GEO. L.J. 1589, 1591, 1610–
18 (2006) [hereinafter Taslitz, Temporal Adversarialism].
118. See id. at 1596–98; Andrew E. Taslitz, Eyewitness Identification, Democratic
Deliberation, and the Politics of Science, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 271, 272
(2006) [hereinafter Taslitz, Democratic Deliberation].
119. See Taslitz, Democratic Deliberation, supra note 118, at 322, 324.
120. See Katherine Driessen & Mike Morris, Mayor’s Decision to Drop Subpoenas Fails
to Quell Criticism, HOUS. CHRON. (Oct. 29, 2014, 11:02 PM), http://www.chron.com/
news/politics/houston/article/Mayor-set-to-make-announcement-on-sermonsubpoenas-5855458.php.
121. FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL (Breon Mitchell trans., Schocken Books 1998) (1925).
122. On the general idea of respect for persons and its role in criminal procedure,
see generally Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, supra note 45, at 15–16.
123. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 3409 (2012) (relating to financial institutions); 15 U.S.C.
§ 57b-2a (same); 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(4) (relating to consumer reports in national
security investigations); 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(1)(D) (relating to civil forfeiture
proceedings); 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (relating to accessing stored communications).
124. See, e.g., LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 8, Standard 25-5.7(c).
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recalibrates the individual regarding what personal information has
been shared, and still permits at least post-action challenge and
deliberation—a chance for second thoughts.125 Even where such
deliberation cannot or does not take place in the courtroom, notice
allows it to take place in the public sphere through news reporting,
petitioning, and public debate. Late notice is better than no notice.
So, subpoenas provide notice, and notice has many important
benefits. But notice, advance or delayed, is best directed at the
individual, group, or entity most affected by the government’s action.
The person potentially incriminated has the most incentive to
challenge the acquisition, ex ante or ex post. Moreover, as a matter
of simple fairness, it is that person, the data originator, who suffers a
privacy harm at the government’s hand.126 To give your next door
neighbors notice that the government plans to sell your house at
auction does you no good when the auctioneers show up to your
surprise. Such covert action cannot be viewed as an instance of fair
procedure. Yet, that is what ordinarily happens with subpoenas
directed to institutional third parties.127
An investigation into the affairs of a Verizon or AT&T subscriber
ordinarily does not implicate the telecommunications provider in any
crime.
Perhaps Verizon has a business incentive to resist a
government subpoena to please its customers, but there are also legal
expenses involved in such resistance, and Verizon has every reason
not to draw government fire in its direction. A subpoena directed
solely to Verizon for records involving customer X may never reach
customer X. Indeed, the law sometimes forbids such disclosure,128
and federal and state prosecutors encourage recipients like Verizon
not to disclose.129 If Verizon decides not to challenge the subpoena,
125. See id. Standard 25-5.7 cmt.
126. An analogous principle underlies the Fifth Amendment rule that the
privilege against self-incrimination applies only to the person who is compelled to
produce the information and only if he is thereby incriminated. Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 397 (1976); see TASLITZ, PARIS & HERBERT, supra note 9, at 817–18.
127. See SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 737, 751 (1984) (restricting
the required notice to the third party in the case of an administrative investigation);
Stephen Wm. Smith, Gagged, Sealed & Delivered: Reforming ECPA’s Secret Docket, 6
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 313, 313–14 (2012) (describing effective lack of notice under
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act).
128. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1510(b) (criminalizing customer notice of a grand jury
subpoena in the banking context).
129. See Joel Cohen & Danielle Alfonzo Walsman, Can You Disclose Your Grand Jury
Subpoena? It’s a Balancing Test, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 15, 2008, at 1, 1–2, available at
https://www.stroock.com/SiteFiles/Pub690.pdf; Reed Albergotti, Google, Microsoft,
Apple to Notify Users About Subpoenas in Privacy Nod; Move Pits Tech Companies Against
Federal Law-Enforcement, WALL ST. J. (May 2, 2014, 7:40 PM), http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB10001424052702304677904579538320088504240.
The general
grand jury secrecy provisions do not bind a witness, see infra note 137, but a
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Verizon will produce the information for the State, potentially with
no notice to the person most affected.130 LEATPR fixes this problem.
All of that said, LEATPR’s is a gentle fix, making it that much less
disruptive to the grand jury process. LEATPR requires notice for
only certain types of records,131 permits delayed notice for cause as
described above,132 and permits a court to prohibit the third party
from itself providing customer notice during that delay period.133 A
court may also limit, or even eliminate, the notice requirement in a
particular case in which it would be unduly burdensome, though of
course the privacy intrusion must be considered in that calculus.134
Most generously, and indeed perhaps too generously, LEATPR
effectively always provides for delayed notice by requiring only that
“notice should generally occur within thirty days after
acquisition.”135 Nonetheless, such ultimate notice would still have
important utility, and it would not be inimical to the beneficial
aspects of grand jury secrecy.136
III. RETENTION AND DISCLOSURE
A. Grand Jury Secrecy
Whereas the traditional grand jury fails to provide the first two
LEATPR methods in the third party records context (levels of
justification and notice), it does provide the third: protection against
unauthorized access and distribution. Indeed, from a privacy
perspective, the strongest argument in favor of treating grand jury
subpoenas as a special case is the longstanding rule of grand jury

prosecutor can move for a protective order doing so in a particular case premised
upon a court’s inherent judicial power. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 417 F.3d
18, 26 (1st Cir. 2005).
130. Part of the fallout from leaks regarding the overzealous—and perhaps
illegal—NSA surveillance has been a pushback from technology companies,
including that they now plan to notify customers regarding subpoenas. Albergotti,
supra note 129. Awareness of surveillance can be bad for business. See Mark Scott,
Irked by N.S.A., Germany Cancels Deal with Verizon, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2014, at B2.
While welcome, such a voluntary plan to notify could of course be retracted at any time.
131. LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 8, Standard 25-5.7(a) (not requiring notice
for minimally protected records); id. Standard 25-5.7(b) (requiring notice for highly
or moderately protected records).
132. Id. Standard 25-5.7(c).
133. Id. Standard 25-5.7(d).
134. Id. Standard 25-5.7(f).
135. Id. Standard 25-5.7(b).
136. For example, grand jurors themselves cannot publicly communicate what
they have received. See infra Part III.A.
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secrecy.137 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) prohibits, with
appropriate—if somewhat complicated—exceptions, disclosure of
matters occurring before the grand jury,138 and almost all states have
similar restrictions.139
To be precise, it is non-witness participants who, as a general
matter, “must not disclose [any] matter occurring before the grand
jury.”140 And disclosure by non-witnesses is permitted in several sets
of circumstances, sometimes requiring a court order or at least court
notification, and usually directed to other government attorneys or
agencies for the purpose of enforcing federal criminal law or some
other criminal, civil, and national security laws.141 Additionally, a
court may order disclosure upon finding “a strong showing of
particularized need” for the information in connection with a judicial
proceeding142 or to a criminal defendant upon a showing “that a
ground may exist to dismiss the indictment because of a matter that
occurred before the grand jury.”143 Thus, grand jury secrecy is not
absolute, but it is significant.
This commitment to secrecy, the Supreme Court has explained,
serves these central functions:
First, if preindictment proceedings were made public, many
prospective witnesses would be hesitant to come forward
voluntarily, knowing that those against whom they testify would be
aware of that testimony. Moreover, witnesses who appeared before
the grand jury would be less likely to testify fully and frankly, as
they would be open to retribution as well as inducements. There
would also be the risk that those indicted would flee, or would try
137. For a history of grand jury secrecy, including in the American colonies, see
Mark Kadish, Behind the Locked Door of an American Grand Jury: Its History, Its Secrecy,
and Its Process, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 12–34 (1996).
138. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
139. See BEALE ET AL., supra note 80, §§ 5:3–5:4; LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 36, § 8.5(b).
140. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(B) (listing and therefore restricting all grand jury
participants other than witnesses); see United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418,
425 (1983) (“Witnesses are not under the prohibition unless they also happen to fit
into one of the enumerated classes.”). Some states do seek to restrict witness
disclosure, but such restrictions raise First Amendment complications. See BEALE ET
AL., supra note 80, § 5:5; LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 36, § 8.5(d).
141. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3); see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3322 (2012) (allowing disclosure
to government attorney for federal civil forfeiture and, upon court order, to federal
and state financial regulating agencies). For full treatment of the secrecy limitations,
see BEALE ET AL., supra note 80, §§ 5:1–5:36; LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 36, § 8.5.
142. Sells Eng’g, 463 U.S. at 443 (interpreting what is now FED. R. CRIM. P.
6(e)(3)(E)(i)); see BEALE ET AL., supra note 80, § 5:12; LAFAVE ET AL., supra note
36, § 8.5(h).
143. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(ii); see BEALE ET AL., supra note 80, § 5:13. A court
may similarly order disclosure at the request of the government in order to enforce
foreign criminal law, state or Indian tribal criminal law, or military criminal law. See
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(iii)–(v).
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to influence individual grand jurors to vote against the indictment.
Finally, by preserving the secrecy of the proceedings, we assure that
persons who are accused but exonerated by the grand jury will not
be held up to public ridicule.144

We know of no empirical data supporting concerns about witness
safety and honesty in the usual case. Indeed, a number of authors
have challenged the rules providing for limited discovery in criminal
cases—which are based on similar concerns—as simply not rooted in
reality.145 Most states use preliminary hearings rather than grand
juries in the run-of-the-mill case,146 yet preliminary hearings are not
protected by special secrecy rules.147 These concerns are, however,
surely valid in individual cases where threats or bribes have been
made or seem likely for case-specific reasons. And grand jury secrecy
rules have value in protecting innocent persons from public ridicule,
even if the rules might not always function very well given the
witnesses’ freedom to disclose. Indeed, such public ridicule is not
deserved even by the guilty, at least not before a trial has determined
such guilt, especially as that ridicule or condemnation can influence
the jury pool and thus the very guilt/innocence decision.148 Secrecy
is part of what privacy is all about.
144. Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 219 (1979); see also
United States v. Amazon Indus. Chem. Corp., 55 F.2d 254, 261 (D. Md. 1931)
(articulating the list that would be adopted by the Supreme Court).
145. See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
CASES AND COMMENTARY 1071–74 (10th ed. 2014) (addressing arguments for and
against broad criminal discovery); Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal
Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 279, 285–88 (arguing
that trial judges can act to protect witnesses shown to be in danger of criminal
discovery); Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 515
(2009) (arguing that the risks of broad disclosure are overstated because several
states and the European continental justice system mandate broad disclosure); Peter
J. Henning, Defense Discovery in White Collar Criminal Prosecutions, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
601, 646–49 (1999) (arguing for greater discovery in white collar prosecutions); Wm.
Bradford Middlekauff, What Practitioners Say About Broad Criminal Discovery Practice:
More Just—or Just More Dangerous?, 9 CRIM. JUST. 14, 16 (1994) (noting that “[t]he vast
majority of academic commentators and numerous judges . . . have endorsed broad
criminal discovery” and that while many states have since 1970 expanded discovery,
none have moved the other way). Middlekauff articulates prosecutor concerns
regarding witness intimidation, but jurisdictions that have expanded discovery have
found that expansion to be manageable and beneficial. See id. at 18–19, 55–58.
146. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 85, §§ 14.2(c)–(d), 15.1(d)–(g); see Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516, 520–21, 538 (1884) (holding that due process does not
require that a grand jury initiate a state felony prosecution).
147. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1. See generally LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 36, §§ 14.1–14.4.
148. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f) (2013) (advising prosecutors
to refrain from making “extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of
heightening public condemnation of the accused”); Andrew E. Taslitz, Information
Overload, Multi-Tasking, and the Socially Networked Jury: Why Prosecutors Should Approach
the Media Gingerly, 37 J. LEGAL PROF. 89, 125–29 (2012) (explaining how the Internet
and constant television news cycles can influence grand jurors); Andrew E. Taslitz,
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But secrecy is not everything that privacy is about, nor of course is
disclosing information to prosecutors and grand jurors preserving
total secrecy. Privacy is fundamentally a right to control what
information about us is available to others, and for what purposes.149
As discussed earlier, there is an obvious difference between sharing
information with your spouse, friend, or counselor and with the
police or a prosecutor.150 What third parties do with information
matters to us, and it should so matter.
Controlling information about ourselves is key to creating intimate
relationships. We share some things with some people because they are
close to us.151 Even when, as is typically the case, that information
imposes no criminal or civil liability, the limitation of the information
to a narrow chosen circle is precisely part of what marks them as close
friends, lovers, or relatives. Even the most patriotic of individuals—
perhaps Captain America excepted—do not love an amorphous and
powerful government in the way that they love a spouse, best friend,
or endearing colleague.
Control of information about ourselves also helps to define our
very identities.
Each of us has complex, multidimensional
personalities. We wear different masks in different circumstances.152
It is hard for any person to get to know another in all her complexity,
especially if they meet rarely and under formal or contentious
circumstances.153 Yet each of us fears being misjudged—a piece of
ourselves or our behavior being given too much weight in assessing
our entirety.154 We thus reveal only selected parts of ourselves. We
have one mask at work, another at school, and another at home.
These are not lies but ways to protect how others assess us, and
humans hold other-assessment dear.155 We want to be seen for whom
we think we are, but we also know that esteem matters, because it is
The Incautious Media, Free Speech, and the Unfair Trial: Why Prosecutors Need More
Realistic Guidance in Dealing with the Press, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1285, 1291–93 (2011)
(arguing that modern society is less likely to question the media and is therefore
more likely to be prejudiced against a defendant).
149. See LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 8, Standard 25-3.3 cmt.; Henderson,
Expectations of Privacy, supra note 13, at 232–33; Taslitz, Human Emotions, supra note
13, at 131, 153–57.
150. See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text.
151. See JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN
AMERICA 8 (2000).
152. See id. at 209–18.
153. Id. at 8 (“True knowledge of another person is the culmination of a slow
process of mutual revelation. It requires the gradual setting aside of social masks, the
incremental building of trust, which leads to the exchange of personal disclosures. It
cannot be rushed . . . .”); see Taslitz, Human Emotions, supra note 13, at 153–57.
154. See ROSEN, supra note 151, at 9.
155. See id. at 8, 210.
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valuable in itself and can bring social resources and power.156
Furthermore, how we believe others understand us affects how we
understand ourselves.157 We are not islands.
The secrecy of the grand jury unquestionably protects some privacy
interests by limiting the circle of persons and groups who learn
information about us. But, for the reasons noted above, it does not
resolve all privacy concerns. Revelation to grand jurors, court
reporters, and prosecutors, and the risk of later revelation to others
via secrecy exceptions or breaches, matter because they represent a
loss of control over the self, over the setting apart of intimate
relationships, and over the masks that help to maintain social esteem.
Such limited revelation may be necessary to serve the State’s interests
in public safety and retribution against criminal wrongdoers. But the
State should have to justify believing there is a danger to safety or a
need for retribution that merits damaging privacy. Again, LEATPR’s
flexible justification requirements serve just that purpose. Indeed,
during drafting one person repeatedly insisted that secrecy
sometimes substitute for levels of justification and notice. But
LEATPR rejects such a model, instead always requiring all three.
B. Secrecy Versus Transparency
As explained above, grand jury secrecy serves multiple objectives,
including providing some limited privacy protection. But because
the grand jury is a government function, it is important to note that
the secrecy of grand juries also has important social costs. Secrecy is
the very absence of transparency,158 and transparency promotes
accountability.159 With transparency, actors know that others will
examine their errors. They fear punishment—even if only denial of a
merit benefit, public reprimand, or harm to reputation. Social
science demonstrates that actors believing they will be held
accountable are more likely to work carefully and less likely to engage

156. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Judging Jena’s D.A.: The Prosecutor and Racial Esteem, 44
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 398–403 (2009).
157. Taslitz, Human Emotions, supra note 13, at 156–57; see Andrew E. Taslitz, A
Feminist Fourth Amendment?: Consent, Care, Privacy, and Social Meaning in Ferguson v.
City of Charleston, 9 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y, 1, 12–25 (2002).
158. See Luna, supra note 33, at 1164 (“[T]ransparency is the ability of the citizenry
to observe and scrutinize policy choices and to have a direct say in the formation and
reformulation of these decisions.”).
159. Id. at 1108–12. For an argument that traditional grand jury secrecy has been
turned on its head to now shield prosecutorial abuse, see Roger Roots, Grand Juries
Gone Wrong, 14 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 331, 351–55 (2010).
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in error, and thus are more likely to make sound decisions and less
likely to make irrational or ill-informed ones.160
Transparency also permits commentary, critique, and conversation,
again improving the likely quality of decisions.
Moreover,
transparency promotes democratic values. It allows citizens to watch
what the government is doing, to feel a sense of participation just by
being kept in the know, to act to change government action or
advocate for new laws, or to make informed electoral decisions.161
In theory, however, secrecy can improve grand jury deliberation in
a way that transparency would not. As one leading commentator on
the grand jury explains,
[s]ecrecy . . . shields the grand jury’s exercise of discretion from
public glare, thereby minimizing the possibility that grand jury
members will feel compelled to base their decisions on concerns
about immediate public backlash in a given case. Thus, secrecy can
lead to greater reflection and richer, more sincere deliberation.162

This argument is similarly used to justify secret petit jury
deliberation.163 But there is a major difference between the two.
Petit juries operate in an adversarial environment, and their factfinding process, the trial, is closely regulated at every stage by a judge
and is viewable by the public. The grand jury operates without a
presiding judge, without defense counsel, and without outside
observers, and then quickly makes decisions largely under
prosecutorial control.164 Secrecy thus does not encourage lengthier,
160. See Taslitz, Police Are People Too, supra note 50, at 64–67. For this and other
obvious reasons, the earliest judicial challenges to grand jury secrecy in America were
by criminal defendants wanting to challenge their indictments. Kadish, supra note
137, at 16–17.
161. See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 918–19 (2006); Andrew Taslitz, Slaves No More!: The Implications of
the Informed Citizen Ideal for Discovery Before Fourth Amendment Suppression Hearings, 15
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 709, 756 (1999).
162. Fairfax, Grand Jury Discretion, supra note 94, at 74 (footnote omitted). For an
early invocation of this type of argument, at least recognizing the potential for jury
tampering, see United States v. Terry, 39 F. 355, 357 (N.D. Cal. 1889).
163. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 737–38 (1993) (“[T]he primary if
not exclusive purpose of jury privacy and secrecy is to protect the jury’s deliberations
from improper influence.”); Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933) (“Freedom
of debate might be stifled and independence of thought checked if jurors were made
to feel that their arguments and ballots were to be freely published to the world.”);
Fairfax, Grand Jury Discretion, supra note 94, at 74–75 (analogizing grand jury secrecy
to that of petit juries); Nancy S. Marder, Deliberations and Disclosures: A Study of PostVerdict Interviews of Jurors, 82 IOWA L. REV. 465, 500–04 (1997) (exploring the potential
negative impact of post-verdict juror interviews on candor during deliberations);
Note, Public Disclosures of Jury Deliberations, 96 HARV. L. REV. 886, 888–92 (1983)
(highlighting the negative effect that public disclosure has on jury deliberations).
164. DOYLE, supra note 38, at 12–14, 18, 20; Susan W. Brenner, The Voice of the
Community, supra note 79, at 67 (“[T]he federal grand jury has become little more
than a rubber stamp, indiscriminately authorizing prosecutorial decisions. At best,
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richer deliberations but merely protects the prosecutor’s degree of
control over the proceedings. By exposing the inner workings of the
grand jury, transparency could lead to corrective processes
promoting more informed, independent grand jury decisions as a
result of public criticism.165
Moreover, when subpoenas are directed at institutional third
parties, there is less reason to be concerned that public pressure will
affect such a grand jury decision. With such subpoenas, the grand
jury—if it is the decision making body—is simply deciding whether to
seek information from one witness and, if so, what information. And
grand juries are passive entities whose existence burdens judicial efficiency and
needlessly drains federal funds.”); William J. Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 174, 174 (1973) (“Today, the grand jury is the total captive
of the prosecutor who, if he is candid, will concede that he can indict anybody, at any
time, for almost anything, before any grand jury. I intend no criticism of prosecuting
officials by this observation. I am a former prosecutor.”); supra notes 78–84 and
accompanying text.
165. Cf. Taslitz, Democratic Deliberation, supra note 118, at 318–20 (arguing that
transparency in criminal justice coordinating councils will lead to open dialogue and
better results).
Other actors in the criminal justice system—most notably
prosecutors—have relatively secret deliberations, exercising largely unreviewed
discretion. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (“In our criminal
justice system, the Government retains ‘broad discretion’ as to whom to prosecute . . . .
This broad discretion rests largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute
is particularly ill-suited to judicial review.”); Peter Krug, Prosecutorial Discretion and Its
Limits, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 643, 645 (2002) (noting the “nearly unfettered
independence” that prosecutors have in charging decisions); Luna, supra note 33, at
1139–41 (noting that prosecutors have “virtually unlimited discretion” on
enforcement of laws); Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 717, 728–59 (1996) (explaining the history of the local prosecutor
and the vast discretion afforded to local police and prosecutors); Taslitz, Democratic
Deliberation, supra note 118, at 296–315; James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1524–37 (1981) (listing the host of
decisions where prosecutors exercise discretion).
Much scholarship challenges whether this state of affairs is desirable. See 2 JOSHUA
DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ADJUDICATION
117–18 (4th ed. 2006) (articulating criticisms of prosecutorial discretion); Bibas,
supra note 161, at 912, 916, 923, 933 (noting the criminal justice system is now the
realm of professionals rather than ordinary citizens); Angela J. Davis, The American
Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 412–14,
462–64 (2001) (noting the potential for prosecutorial misconduct “behind closed
doors” and advocating increased public disclosure and review of prosecutorial
decisions); Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion,
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 17–18, 25–38, 54–56 (1998) (suggesting that prosecutorial
discretion is “a major cause of racial inequality” and arguing for the publication of
racial impact studies); Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing
Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851,
855–79 (1995) (arguing for financial incentives as a mechanism to limit
prosecutorial discretion); Misner, supra, at 766–72 (advocating that prosecutorial
discretion should be “linked directly to the availability of prison resources”);
Vorenberg, supra, at 1554 (asserting that the “existence and exercise of
prosecutorial discretion are inconsistent with the most fundamental principles of our
system of justice”).
And desirable or not, its existence alone cannot justify expansive, unreviewable,
secret grand jury activities. The grand jury’s structure must be justified on its own.
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the witness is a third party witness rather than a principal player. It is
an important decision, but not as likely to garner public backlash as
the ultimate decision of whether to proceed against a person as an
offender, meaning whether to indict.
If the desired closer supervision of subpoenas would be done by a
judge, rather than the grand jurors, the grand jury is thereby freed
from any outside political pressures. Judges are affected by politics,
too, albeit in a more indirect, complex way.166 But our system
assumes that judges can resist overt public pressures of this sort and
that it is not in the interest of society for judges to act in secret.167
They are expected to explain the reasons for their decisions fully,
defending them in written opinions.168
The grand jury system, if reformed in certain ways, could be an
effective democratic deliberating body. Grand juries have the power
to gain access to a wide array of information.169 They are drawn
locally and are relatively small in size.170 Although ordinary citizens in
everyday politics frequently act from ignorance,171 the power to
obtain information could theoretically be used to remove grand juror
ignorance. If the proceedings were solemn and slow, they would
impress grand jurors with their own power under these
circumstances, motivating them to do the hard work of both
obtaining information and processing it in order to understand it.172
166. See, e.g., Paul Brace & Brendt D. Boyea, Judicial Selection Methods and Capital
Punishment in the American States, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL,
FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 186, 189 (Matthew J. Streb ed.,
2007) (concluding that the prospect of elections affects judges’ decisions in capital
punishment cases); Matthew J. Streb, How Judicial Elections Are Like Other Elections and
What That Means for the Rule of Law, in WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT?: WHAT JUDGES
DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND WHAT’S AT STAKE 195, 195–215 (Charles Gardner Geyh ed.,
2011) (surveying many of the ways in which judicial elections are and are not like
other political election contests); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK
(2008); cf. KEITH J. BYBEE, ALL JUDGES ARE POLITICAL—EXCEPT WHEN THEY ARE NOT:
ACCEPTABLE HYPOCRISIES AND THE RULE OF LAW 1–4 (2010) (presenting data
evidencing that citizens believe the judicial process to be both infused with politics
and nonpolitical at the same time).
167. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Hypocrisy, Corruption, and Illegitimacy: Why Judicial
Integrity Justifies the Exclusionary Rule, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 419, 440–42 (2013)
(arguing that judicial legitimacy hinges on the perception of judges as impartial arbiters).
168. See Christopher Engel, The Psychological Case for Obliging Judges to Write Reasons,
in THE IMPACT OF COURT PROCEDURE ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION
MAKING 71, 75–78 (Christopher Engel & Fritz Strack eds., 2007) (highlighting many
benefits of requiring judges to write legal opinions).
169. See Fairfax, Grand Jury Discretion, supra note 94, at 73.
170. See DOYLE, supra note 38, at 3–4 (noting that panels usually have between
sixteen and twenty-three jurors).
171. See ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER
GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER 17–20 (2013).
172. Cf. Taslitz, Temporal Adversarialism, supra note 117, at 1602–19 (discussing the
virtues of slow deliberation).
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Grand jurors would feel their power to interpret the law
independently and to nullify it when it does an injustice. They might
view their deliberations as having weighty consequences. Indeed,
petit jurors engaging in lengthy deliberations over complex and
serious criminal charges often feel so empowered that they become
A powerful, diverse,
politically active for the first time.173
independent grand jury might be trusted to decide when to issue
subpoenas that breach privacy, and when not to do so.174 But that is
not the grand jury we have, however much it may be the grand jury
that many reformers want.
The nation recently experienced a rare and poignant example of
transparency in the grand jury process. The state of Missouri
released, in only slightly redacted form, the grand jury materials
relating to the no bill decision for Ferguson police officer Darren
Wilson in the shooting death of Michael Brown.175 Although this is
not the place for an examination of their contents, which are highly
unusual in their length and scope, and although obviously this
transparency did not in this instance prevent another unfortunate
round of violence,176 the release has allowed, and will continue to
allow, divergent commentators to make an educated assessment and
critique not only of that grand jury process but also of the underlying
police investigation.177 And because the grand jurors were told
173. See JOHN GASTIL ET AL., THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY: HOW JURY DELIBERATION
PROMOTES CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 9–11 (2010) (showing
through empirical study how jury service caused jurors to vote more, pay closer
attention to the news, engage more with their neighbors about community issues,
and participate more in charitable organizations); Andrew E. Taslitz, The People’s
Peremptory Challenge and Batson: Aiding the People’s Voice and Vision Through the
“Representative” Jury, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1675, 1678 (2012) [hereinafter Taslitz, The
People’s Peremptory Challenge].
174. Cf. Taslitz, The People’s Peremptory Challenge, supra note 173, at 1692–1706
(discussing the virtues of petit jury diversity).
175. See Evidence Released by McCulloch, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO, http://apps.
stlpublicradio.org/ferguson-project/evidence.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2014); see
also Documents Released in the Ferguson Case, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2014/11/25/us/evidence-released-in-michael-brown-case.html (last updated
Dec. 15, 2014); Documents from the Ferguson Grand Jury, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/
interactive/2014/11/us/ferguson-grand-jury-docs/index.html (last updated Nov. 25,
2014). Witness names have been redacted from the transcripts of their interviews.
176. See Davey & Fernandez, supra note 5.
177. See, e.g., Julie Bosman et al., Amid Conflicting Accounts, Trusting Darren Wilson,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/26/us/fergusongrand-jury-weighed-mass-of-evidence-much-of-it-conflicting.html; Paul Cassell, The
Michael Brown Grand Jury Process Was Fair, WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/11/25/themichael-brown-grand-jury-process-was-fair; Jason Cherkis & Nick Wing, Ferguson
Grand Jury Evidence Reveals Mistakes, Holes In Investigation, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 25,
2014, 7:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/25/ferguson-grand-juryevidence-mistakes_n_6220814.html; Kaimipono Wenger, We Need More Ferguson-style
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upfront that the release would be made, it may have solemnized
their still-secret deliberations.178 There is no doubt that there is a
tension between, on the one hand, transparency and the norms it
promotes (including accuracy and accountability), and, on the
other hand, secrecy.
All that said, we are not making a brief for ending grand jury
secrecy. That secrecy has important benefits. Our point is merely
that it also has costs. And our argument is simply that, on balance,
secrecy neither renders privacy protections unnecessary for the focus
of subpoenas directed to institutional third parties, nor serves social
goals so important as to outweigh privacy protection. To (1) embrace
prior notice (absent particularized evidence of a safety or destruction
of evidence danger) to the focus of a records subpoena (the person
or group who is the original source or who may suffer as a result of
the information’s revelation to the government), (2) give the focus
standing to challenge that subpoena, and (3) require the State to
establish some level of justification for the subpoena, are small
incursions on grand jury secrecy which serve a greater privacy good.
In the routine case, and perhaps in many other cases, secrecy provides
little reason to carve out a grand jury exception to LEATPR.179
IV. OTHER ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS
LEATPR requires that a legislature provide means of accountability
“via appropriate criminal, civil, and/or evidentiary sanctions, and
appropriate periodic review and public reporting.”180 As already
described above, and as with the other LEATPR methods, there is no
reason to entirely exempt grand juries from such accountability
Grand Juries, DAILY BEAST (Nov. 30, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/
2014/11/30/we-need-more-ferguson-style-grand-juries.html. This is not to say that
the release of materials is without its critics. See Benjamin Weiser, Mixed Motives Seen
in Prosecutor’s Decision to Release Ferguson Grand Jury Materials, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/26/us/mixed-motives-seen-in-prosecutorsdecision-to-release-ferguson-grand-jury-materials.html.
178. See 1 Transcript of Grand Jury Proceedings at 20–21, available at
http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1370490-grand-jury-volume-1.html.
179. While we hope to have made a persuasive case, given the social value of
privacy, the “burden of proof” should lay with the supporters of the grand jury
exception, not its opponents. Note, too, that any fears that the modest secrecy
breach will harm an individual’s reputation are partly addressed because the person
facing potential harm—the focus of the record—chooses to go to court to challenge
the subpoena. The focus thus voluntarily agrees to revelation—at least to the
judge—for the purpose of protecting other privacy interests and other kinds of
secrecy, namely the secrecy of the content of the records at issue. Any new rule of
procedure might make the judicial proceedings closed ones at the request of the
focus or, if the government shows safety danger, at the request of the prosecution,
keeping in mind the secrecy-transparency tradeoff.
180. LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 8, Standard 25-7.1.
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mechanisms. Nor are they currently exempt. For example, the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that a knowing violation
of grand jury rules may be punished as a contempt of court,181 and
there may be a private civil remedy as well.182
The easiest accountability mechanisms to justify are those requiring
public reporting and periodic review. Unlike the more nuanced
discussion above of whether to publicize, even in a limited manner,
the particulars of a grand jury request—for example, that the grand
jurors wish to examine the bank records of Andrew Taslitz—there is
almost no risk and tremendous advantage in publishing composite
statistics regarding the following: how often grand juries are
convened and for what purposes (for example, what crimes are
considered),183 how often they return true bills, how often they return
no bills, how often matters are otherwise declined, and how often
and in what quantities they access given types of records. Much like
the reporting concerning other methods of access required by
existing legislation,184 such aggregate data will permit informed and
engaged debate regarding the proper role of the grand jury in our
criminal justice system.185
It seems farfetched that access to such aggregate data would
meaningfully inform lawbreakers in a manner that renders future
prosecution more difficult, or at least any such effect should be offset
by a potential increase in deterrence. Statistics are published even
for the extremely secretive Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
and have, in fact, been used to argue that the court does not provide
a meaningful check on national security surveillance.186 Informed
debate cannot occur without such data, and there could be a
mechanism for a prosecutor or department to urge the extremely rare
circumstance in which disclosure would be substantially detrimental.
Some statistical evidence is currently published. The United States
Attorneys’ Annual Statistical Report includes the number of criminal
181. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(7).
182. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 36, § 8.5(i) (discussing conflicting jurisprudence
regarding a private civil remedy for violation of the secrecy requirements).
183. For these purposes, the relevant “convening” is of course how often a grand
jury is considering a certain type of illegality or impropriety, not merely how many
grand juries are currently empanelled and thus theoretically could be so engaged.
184. E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552a(s) (the Privacy Act) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 2519 (the
Wiretap Act).
185. Cf. Bibas, supra note 161, at 917, 955–59 (arguing for better published data
regarding charge, conviction, and sentencing); Lawrence Rosenthal, The Statement
and Account Clause as a National Security Freedom of Information Act (forthcoming)
(arguing for better published data regarding national security expenditures).
186. See GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE: EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE NSA, AND
THE U.S. SURVEILLANCE STATE 128–29 (2014).
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matters in which grand jury proceedings were conducted and the
number of work hours so dedicated.187 And, from 1959 to 1991, these
reports included the number of “no true bills,” disclosing how often
federal grand juries refused a prosecutorial offer to indict (Table
One).188 But when that number settled at astoundingly low levels
around 1991 (a 99.9% indictment success rate), the number of no
true bills ceased to be included.189 However, data from the Bureau of
Justice Statistics (BJS) indicate that the number of no bills has not
increased since that time (Table Two).190 Even taking into account
the relatively low indictment threshold (as compared to the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard required for conviction), achieving a
99.9% success rate is remarkable. This is especially so when one
considers that some no true bills might be urged by a prosecutor who
is either surprised by how the evidence turned out (though this is
likely very rare, as the prosecutor controls the presentation and in
any event could simply decline to present charges) or as a “solution”
to a politically difficult matter, including to deflect pressure from
victims or other interest groups.191 That allegation is certainly being
made in the recent no bill decisions in both Ferguson, Missouri and
New York City.192 But whatever the case in those instances, the
bottom line is simply that were the grand jury an effective check on
prosecutorial power, nobody could be that good.193

187. E.g., U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATT’YS, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2013 8, 80–82 (2013), available
at http://www.justice.gov/usao/reading_room/reports/asr2013/13statrpt.pdf.
188. Copies of the annual statistical reports are available on the U.S. Department
of Justice website for the years 1959 through 2013. See generally Annual Statistical
Reports, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/usao/resources/reports (last
visited Dec. 30, 2014).
189. See id. (providing the statistical reports for the years 1959–2013).
190. Publications & Product: Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics, BUREAU JUST.
STAT., http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbse&sid=4 (last visited Dec. 30, 2014).
191. For an analysis of this prosecutorial success, see Andrew D. Leipold,
Prosecutorial Charging Practices and Grand Jury Screening: Some Empirical Observations, in
GRAND JURY 2.0, supra note 35, at 195; Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not
(And Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 260, 274–75 (1995).
192. See Jonsson, supra note 6.
193. Cf. THE DEVIL’S ADVOCATE (Regency Enterprises 1997) (“It was a nice run,
Kevin. Had to close out some day. Nobody wins them all.”).
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TABLE ONE
Data from U.S. Attorneys’ Annual Statistical Report
Year

Total Grand
Indictments
No True Bills
U.S. Attorney
Jury
Success Rate
Proceedings
(%)
1959
15,397
14,673
724
95.30
1960
14,646
14,088
558
96.19
1961
15,100
14,565
535
96.46
1962
15,826
15,285
541
96.58
1963
16,121
15,591
530
96.71
1964
16,480
16,061
419
97.46
1965
17,511
16,950
561
96.80
1966
17,709
17,064
645
96.36
1967
19,197
18,663
534
97.22
1968
18,891
18,569
322
98.30
1969
22,565
22,209
356
98.42
1970
24,545
24,243
302
98.77
1971
29,299
29,079
220
99.25
1972
32,033
31,840
193
99.40
1973*
30,235
30,015
220
99.27
1974
25,786
25,595
191
99.26
1975
27,222
27,067
155
99.43
1976**
—
—
—
—
1977
21,531
21,412
119
99.45
1978
19,509
19,405
104
99.47
1979
16,446
16,356
90
99.45
1980
16,592
16,507
85
99.49
1981
16,794
16,699
95
99.43
1982
17,064
16,989
75
99.56
1983
17,765
17,702
63
99.65
1984
17,487
17,419
68
99.61
1985
17,094
17,051
43
99.75
1986
20,111
20,045
66
99.67
1987
19,263
19,224
39
99.80
1988
20,184
20,156
28
99.86
1989
23,203
23,172
31
99.87
1990
23,925
23,914
11
99.95
1991***
25,943
25,927
16
99.94
* The 1973 data is internally inconsistent, reporting 30,015 indictments and 220
no bills, but a total of 30,215 grand jury proceedings. For purposes of this table we
have assumed the latter number is incorrect, but of course it could be any of the three.

TASLITZ.HENDERSON.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2/3/2015 8:14 PM

228

[Vol. 64:195

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

** The Report for 1976 could not be located. All other reports from 1955
through 2013 are available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/resources/reports.
*** The Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys has not included the number of “no
true bills” in its annual statistical reports since 1991.

TABLE TWO
Data from BJS Federal Justice Statistics
Year

1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

Suspects Received
by the U.S.
Attorney
110, 286
99,251
102,220
97,776
110,034
115,692
117,994
123,559
121,818
124,335
130,078
141,212
137,590
133,935
138,410
178,570
188,341
187,916

Total Suspects
Declined
33,678
34,424
35,896
32,832
29,069
28,786
31,004
30,444
32,250
33,674
33,602
31,866
29,755
29,677
29,232
28,102
29,780
30,670

Total Suspects
Declined due to
No True Bill
50
38
39
41
15
33
35
29
21
23
50
14
11
15
23
20
20
11

In the last few years, a number of private entities have begun
publishing “transparency reports” to provide data on how often they
release information to law enforcement.194 The government should
itself provide consistent and thorough aggregate data on the use of
the grand jury’s investigative and accusative functions.

194. See, e.g., Google Transparency Report, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/
transparencyreport (last visited Dec. 30, 2014).
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CONCLUSION
“The grand jury is a ‘much maligned’ organ of the criminal justice
system,”195 and recent events have renewed and intensified criticism.
Perhaps at least some criticism is inevitable for any institution that
seeks both to investigate in order to accuse and to protect from
accusation. But the criticism is appropriate when the modern grand
jury seems to have put all of its energies, and few meaningful checks,
into its investigatory function, allowing its shield function to atrophy.
Or at least that shield function has generally been subject to atrophy
but, ironically, might remain strong in the unique circumstance of
potential charges against police. It is telling that the grand jury right
is the only criminal procedure provision in the Bill of Rights that has
been held not to apply as against the states.196
This Article can certainly be read in that critical tradition. The
modern grand jury simply does not live up to common and historic
aspirations. But as with much of that critical literature, we aim at
least in the first instance to improve the constitutionally-ensconced
institution, not to eliminate or belittle it. There could come a day in
which the people once again depend not only upon the grand jury’s
ultimate “shield” function for their liberty, but also upon its potential
to limit harmful and inappropriate investigation while initiating its
own investigation unpopular to those in power.197 Perhaps we have
seen a glimpse of that recently, and that chance might be reason
enough to preserve it.
The ABA’s Criminal Justice Standards on Law Enforcement Access
to Third Party Records provides a helpful vehicle, in that its four
protective mechanisms could be used not only to better respect the
privacy of third party records obtained via grand jury subpoena but to
improve the functioning of that institution more generally. It is thus
unfortunate that the grand jury, both in its historic form and in
the form of prosecutorial “equivalents,” was exempted from
LEATPR’s provisions. Hopefully the legislation LEATPR inspires, as
well as future iterations of those Standards, will instead thoughtfully
apply to the grand jury.198
195. Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Grand Jury Innovation: Toward a Functional Makeover of the
Ancient Bulwark of Liberty, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 339, 339 (2010) (citing
Benjamin E. Rosenberg, A Proposed Addition to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
Requiring the Disclosure of the Prosecutor’s Legal Instructions to the Grand Jury, 38 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1443, 1462 (2001)). For a summary of some of those critiques, see id. at 341–45.
196. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034–35 nn.12–13 (2010).
197. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 36, § 8.2(b) (describing the grand jury of the
early American experience as well as, very briefly, some of its demise).
198. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 55 (1992) (recognizing that
legislatures, in this case Congress, can modify the grand jury function).

